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Financial Regulation and the Competitiveness of the Large

U.S. Corporation
CENTRAL QUESTION OF TI-IL DAY is whether U.S. business firms are capable of success in highly competitive world markets. The question is embedded in hotly debated calls for the United States to develop an explicit industrial pohcv, in frequently expressed concerns about our loss of market leadership in the computer chip, television and automobile industries, and in charges of excessive executive compensation. It is important to consider the efficiency of the large corporation when answering this question and what I discuss here is a connection between corporate efficiency and the regulation of capital narket institutions.
The legal setting of a large U.S. corporation is usually thought of in terms of regulations that hear directly on the activities of business firms. These include business tax policv environmental protection legislation, worker safety and health regulation, and antitrust. Because legal settings for business vary from nation to nation, regulalions undoubtedly affect relative efficiencies of business firms differently in different parts of the world. Business regulation of this type has been discussed explicitly on many occasions, so I set it aside here. Instead, I give attention to the neglected connection between corporate efficiency and the regulation of capital market institutions. Mv purpose is to show how the regulation of banks, insurance companies and mutual funds impinges on shareholder control of top management in hIS, corporations.
Because most~at this conference do not work in corporate economics, it is useful to begin by considering the potential control p'oblem created by the diffuse ownership structure on which the modern large corporation rests-separation of ownership and control. This well-known agency problem has been around for some time. Even Adam Smith voiced concern in The Wealth of Nations, precisely because he believed that those who manage the funds of others cannot be expected to do as good a job as if their own funds were at stake. Along with many contemporary economists, the works of \Te~Jlen(1921), Berle and Means (1932), and Galhraith (1967) build heavily on this corporate control problem Their works assert that owners of shares each have an ownership stake in the corporation that is too small to motivate efforts to control management and that is too small to convey disciplinary weight even if such efforts were made.
Dissatisfied shareholders can do little better than sell their shares. If such sales are large, the price per share will fall and adversely affect the terms on which management can raise new capital from the capital markets. This price effect penalizes errant management, but it does so only indirectly and only to the extent that the corporation finds it necessary to raise new capital.
The alleged weakening of the link between ownership and control makes the proposition correlating private ownership and efficient resource allocation mor-e problematic in the minds of some students of the corporation. Uncontrolled professional management is likely to see its interest served, at least partly, by high management compensation, large fir-m size, altruism toward friends and community, leisure and other' forms of on-the-job consumption and by indulging in these to an extent that seems inimical to shareholder interests.
The thesis appears to he much like that which popularly explains the failings of socialism. If all citizens are in pr-inciple owners of state proper-ty then no person qua citizen can exercise control over this property. Ownership is simply too diffuse to he effective. Managing this property then becomes the task of state bureaucracies. State employees, however, haye interests that do not coincide with those of the population at large, and the pursuit of these interests is not guided by market incentives. A separation between owner-ship and control arises and undermines the credibility of socialism. The separation thesis as applied to the large corporation substitutes professional management for state bureaucracies.' Studies of corporate takeovers, mainly corporate takeovers undertaken in the United States during the 1 980s, provide evidence of some instances of separation between ownership and conti-ol. These show that shareholders of target companies benefit considerably from a takeover of their firm. Successful takeovers increase share prices of target firms by an average of about 30 percent! Increases in share price may derive in part from several aspects of takeovers. The dominant view is that most of target shareholder gains derive from the removal of inept management, whose presence is consistent with the separation thesis! It should be noted, however, that only a small fraction of corporate assets has become the target of takeover attempts. This can he interpreted as statistical support for a proposition contrary to the separation thesis-that most moder-n corporations are not afflicted by significant separation between ownership and control.
The indictment of the modern corporation implicit in the separation th.esis creates its own puzzle. Because the corporation, including its ownership structure, arises from contractual agr-eements voluntarily enter-ed into, the separation thesis implies that serious, systematic and persistent errors are made hy owners of the cor-poration in relying on ownership structures that are too diffuse. Owners fail to anticipate that they are abandoning control over their assets. This is inconsistent with the belief held by most economists that all parties to an agreemnent i-cached voluntarily expect to benefit from the agreement and that if the agreement is used repeatedly and extensively, this expectation is usually correctHowever, the empirical supposition of the separation thesis, the ''fact'' to which all adherents to the thesis have subscribed, is not at all fact. It is simply not the case that the ownership structure of the typical large corporation is so diffuse that it undermines the incentive and power of shareholders to influence management. That thousands of shareholders jointly own the typical lar-ge corporation is t r-ue, hut recent studies show that not every owner of corporate stock owns an insignificant number of shares. A few of the thousands of shareholders usually own a relatively large fraction of the firm's equitv.~In fact, the typical large corpor-ation has a more concenti-ated ownership structure than serves the separation thesis well. For Fortune-500-sized U.S. corpot-ations, the aggregate fr'action of equity owned by the five largest shareholders is about one-fourth, and in Japan and several important European countries 'Socialized property and jointly owned corporate property are, however, far from equivalent. Socialized ownership is coerced into being, whereas corporate ownership is devised voluntarily. Given the facts of economic development and per capita wealth in East and West, we can surmise only that it there is separation between ownership and control in the large private corporation, it is less severe by several orders of magnitude than it is in the socialist state. 2 See Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988). 
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this fraction is much lar'ger. The typical case then is one in which a relatively small number of shareholders have well focused interests and nontrivial blocks of votes. Facing such concentrated share holdings, professiomil management cannot he as unguided 1w shareholder interests as the sepat-ation thesis supposes, although there sm-ely are some cases in which ownership structur'e has become too diffuse to serve shareholder interests well. When this occurs, ownership should he restructured! Restr-ucturing occurs in two ways. Corporate takeovers provide a dramatic mnechanism for' concentrating existing diffuse ownership structures. Less dramatically hut more continuously, ownership is restructured through the normal issuing and purchasing of equity shares. At an~' given time the diffuseness with which shat-es of firmns at-c held varies acr'oss corporations, hut restructuring should adapt ownership structures to the different situations confr-onted by different firms. This imnplies that observed structures should hear a sensible relationship to these situations. More specifically, we may posit that variations in ownership structure reflect the benefits and costs to shareholders of controlling professional management tightly.
Concentrated ownership (and consequent tight control over management) comes at a cost. If this cost is high, the ownership structure that is truly profit maximizing must look much like that of the single-owner fii-m. This is the case in particular for large firms because size of firm correlates with one of the major costs of concentrated ownership-the hearing Of firm-specific risk. Because controlling shareholder-s would tend to have a large fraction of their wealth invested in a single fir-ni if this firm is large, they would be exposing themselves to firm-specific risk. 'The larger the firm, the ku-ger is the wealth they must commit to own a controlling share of equity, and hence the greater is their exposure to firmspecific risk. The risk-adjusted, uti]ity-maxiniizing ownet-ship structure for large firms, contrat-y to what is suggested by the separation thesis, is not the single.owner firm.' It is a more diffuse ownership structure because the cost of hearing firm-specific risk should he reflected in the optimal ownership structure. Nonetheless, this structure should be one in which enough shares are owned by a few shareholders that they can exercise more than a modicum of control over professional management. The data r-eveal precisely this-greater diffuseness in ownership structure for larger firms accompanied by enough concentration of ownership to imbue large shareholding interests with influence over management. This pattern of ownership, which suggests that shareholders choose ownership structures that maximnize the value of their firms, has been confirmed for Swedish, Japanese and South African firms! Of course, management cannot he disciplined so thoroughly by controlling shareholder's and by the threat of corporate takeovers that ineptness is dethroned at once wherever and when, ever it exists. tn this respect, it is important to remember that ownership is not structured exclusivelv for the purpose of dealing with management ineptness. Other things matter to ownership structure and to risk-adjusted profit, such as the avoidance of firm-specific risk. If ownership is structured to maximize t-isk-adjusted utility, it must not he so tightly structured that all error in judginig professional management is ehimi rutted. Moreover, because there is a cost to altering the structure of ownership quickly, profits are also maximized by tolerating a lag hetween evidence of uieptness and altering ownership structure appropi-iatelv. Things will get out of whack on 'There are several ways by which professional management can be guided to serve shareholder interest in the modern corporation-concentrated ownership (achieved through the normal financing of corporations or through corporate takeovers), the consequences of the capital market's measurement of management performance, legal proceedings, and compensation systems. Time and space allow me to consider here only concentrated ownership. This is unfortunate especially in regard to executive compensation, for there are new empirical results to report about this. It is improbable that all these mechanisms transform the modern corporation into a precise analog of the firm pictured in neoclassical theory, but they do raise serious questions about the Berle and Means thesis. 'I speak somewhat superficially in reference to risk-adjusted utility maximization. Suppose a real corporation is owned by a single person, and suppose further that he guides his professional managers without error to pursue his chosen ends. Although risk-adjusted profit always looms important to this owner, it need not be his sole concern. He might derive satisfaction from owning a larger firm even if it is less profitable. or from using the firm's assets to cater to personal utility maximization. The reduction in profit he thereby bears must not be thought of as a loss sustained because an agency problem separates his interests from management's behavior, There is no agency problem here, there is simply the recognition that in cases such as this, profit maximization for the owner does not equate to utility maximization for the owner. This may also hold for degrees of ownership concentration less than the 100 percent just assumed. 7 See Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990), Prowse (1991), and
Gerson (1992).
occasion, and when they do, dramatic restruc.-turing of ownership is more likely to be called forth in the guise of a corporate takeover. What seems to be true then is that professional management is not fr'ee of suhstantive guidance by shareholders, hut that the degree of guidance, because it responds to problems of risk and other similar concerns, will not generally he designed solely for-the purpose of controlling management malfeasance. From a shareholder's per'spective, the optimal amount of management malfeasance is positive, not zero. Just what is optimal, however, is affected by the legal environment, and especially by laws bearing on the oper'ation of capital market institutions. Ownership will tend to he more concentrated, and management malfeasance will consequently be less pervasive to the extent that these laws do not raise the cost of maintaining concentrated ownership structur-es.
Recent data reveal a puzzle regarding ownership concentration. After standardizing for variahles that should influence the ownership structure of corporations, such as firm size and firmspecific risk, studies of cot-porate ownership reveal large differences across countries in the typical degree to which ownership is concent rated. Ownership is noticeably more diffuse in U.S. corporations than in Japanese, European and South Afr-ican corporations. In the typical large corporation in the tJnited States, the top five shareholders, as a gr-oup, own about onefourth of the firm's outstanding voting stock. Most cor-porations traded on South Africa's Johanneshurg Stock Exchange are controlled 1w small shareholder groups who own 50 percent or more of voting stock.' Ownership structures in Germany and Sweden are more like South Africa than the United States.' In Japan, the five largest shareholders own about 33 percent of voting shares.'"
The differences between the United States and these other countries are so large that we must suspect that the cost of concentrating corpo]ate ownership differ's substantially froni nine countr-y to another and for reasons not captur-ed hy the variables being used to index this cost. If a fiye-shar'eholdei-gr-oup owning one-fourth of the voting equity of the typical large corporation is a suitable ownership structure in the United States, why is it not in other countries? A plausible source of this difference is in variation across nations of regulations that impinge on ownership structure and which make it more costly to maintain con tr'ol in the typical large IJ.S. cor-poration than in the typical ku-ge non-U.S. corporation. Important capital market institutions in the United States do hear special costs to hold large stakes in the equities of other companies, and our banks a re barred fr'om holding any stake."
One potential source of equity capital is the investment company, hut the Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts the ability of investment companies to take concentrated equity positions in the firms in which the~' invest if they advertise themselves as diversified investment companies. 'I'her-e is a tax advantage to registering as a diversified investment company, since this entitles the company to pass income through to its investors without paying taxes, hut even investment companies that do not register as diversified are barred from exercising control over any firm engaged in interstate commerce. Hence funds channeled through investment companies are unlikely sources of controlling positions in the equity Of corporations.
Insurance companies are another potentially important source of equity capital, and most states dci allow insurance companies to invest a percentage of their assets in common stock. The percentage varies from state to state hut is commnonl~' about 20 percent. New York, a particularly important state for insurance, limits the amount that insurance companies can invest in one company to 2 percent of the insurance company's assets. Most other states have similar restrictions, but the percentage varies over a large range. States generally bar insur-ance companies from owning more than a stipulated percentage of the shares of other companies. A common upper hound is 10 percent. Finally, there frec~uentlyis a penalty borne liv insurance companies that invest in common stock; most states require that capital he set aside to maintain a financial cushion against declines in the price of stock held for invest rnent~itirposes. ,Although it is not impossible to use funds channeled through°S
eeGerson (1992). 'See Sundqvist (1986).°P rowse(1991).
''My summary discussion of the details of some of the relevant legislation rests heavily on work by Paul S. Clyde (1990) .
insurance companies to takeaconcentrated equity position in a given corporation, it clearly is an investment tactic that is generally dIiscoin-aged liv state-imposed restrictions. Hence, a second capital market institution is handicapped in such an undertaking.
For more than 60 years the Glass-Steagall Act has barred banks from directly owning equity in tJ.S. corporations. 't'her-e is no counterpar't to this law in South Africa and in much of Western Europe. and only recently has Japan adopted a similar law. Although banks would seem to be low-cost conduits of equity capital, Glass.Steagall forces corporations to raise equity funds from other sources. In fact, banks play important equity roles in other' nations, where they supply enough equity to own sizeable positions in corporate ownership structures. The possible connection between Glass-Steagall and ownership structure, however', is not generally suspected even though banks are potentially a major sour-ce of equity investment capital in the United States. 12 If the hehavior of for-eign banks in their-own countries is a guide to what U.S. banks would (10 if allowed to invest in corporate equity, it seems likely' that U.S. banks would lie important sources not only of equity capital, hut also of concentrated ownership positions. A third major source of concentrated ownership is thus harm-ed by legislation.
Because of recent court decisions, employment retirement funds remain one important source of capital that is free to take equity positions, even concentrated equity positions. In fact, we find a few of these funds playing key roles in mnonitor-ing and disciplining corporate managemnent liv virtue of their large holdings of stock in particular corporations. Most notable in this regard is the Califor-nia State Employees Retirement Fund, but other-s have also become activist. For reasons discussed later, however, I do not believe that these funds offer monitoring and disciplining services as good as those likely to conne from capital market institutions presently barred or penalized from taking large equity positions in specific corpom-ations.
The consequence of these legal harrier's is that corporations housed in the United States rely' on capital that is secur-ed dim-ectly from individual investors to a much gm-eater extent than corporations located overseas. Really large controlling positions in the equity of U.S. corpor'ations are taken mainly by individual and family investors in the United States. Because of greater portfolio specialization, these individuals and families are exposed to more firm-specific risk than capital market institutions would he. Moreover-, individual or' family wealth is seldom large enough to allow concentrated holdings of the equity of large corporations. The heavy reliance in the United States on this source of equity capital results in corporate ownership structures much more diffuse than those that exist for comparable foreign corporations. The optimal degree of control exercised by shareholder's over the managements of their U.S. comporations, as a result of such legislation, is less than elsewhere.
Am-guments pro and con can be made in regard to the various legal hurdles that keep important institutional conduits of capital from accessing the equity markets easily. Whatever the truth in this regard, the effect of these legal hurdles on ownership structure and control has not yet been taken into account. The control problem created by these hurdles, taken by itself, offers a novel basis for opposing such legislation.
But can institutional investors-for example, investment companies, insurance companies and banks-be relied on to perform the ownership function %yell? Since their capital comes from diffuse sources, it would seemn that their-own operations should be subject to the separation problem believed to plague large corpor-ations. If so, institutional investors holding controlling positions in the equity structure of large corporations cannot lie expected to perform the duties of owner as well as investors whose own wealth is at stake. I discuss this issue in the r-emnaindemof this paper, showing that the control problem can he ameliorated by such institutions hut not as completely as if individuals owned concentrated ownership positions in corporations directly.
'i'here are institutional investors that seem capable of circumventing the problem created b their' own diffuse ownership structure,, and there are other's that seem not so capable of doing this. The distinction between the two lies in the ease with which individual investors can reclaim their funds fmoni the institution. The openended mutual stock fund is organized so that investors can insist that the fund huv back their shares at the net asset value they represent in ' 2 Exceptions include Prowse (1990) and Gerson (1992) . the fund's portfolio. The closed-end stock fund has no such ohligation; an investor who wants to convert his shares in such a fund to cash may sell them at whatever market-determined pm-ice they' fetch, hut he cannot demand their redemption by the fund. This is an important difference when it comes to the issue of separation hetween ownership and control. To see its importance, let us reconsider the separation pi-ohlem in the context of the corporation.
Two conditions must exist for the sepam'ation pm-ohlem to lie severe in a colporation. One is the gener-ally recognized condition that ownership structure lie diffuse. The other is the condition that assets made available to a cor-pom-ation by shareholdet-s must belong to it and not to shareholders. This second condition has not been m-ecognized explicitly in economic literature, hut it is important. It refers to the fact that, although the shareholder-may sell his shares if be is dissatisfied, the sham-eholdem-cannot insist that the corporation lie the buyer of his shares. Thus the corporation, not the sham-cholder-, has title to the productive assets it has pum-chased with funds securecl from its initial issue of stock." If shareholders could reclaim these assets, the severity' of the separation problem would lie lessened even for diffuse ownership structures. It would lie lessened even more if share ownership were concentm-ated, liecause shareholders with munch at stake will lie mnore attentive to what management has heen doing with the firm's assets.
It is not practical to allow shareholders to reclaim their share of the firm's assets in the general case of the business firm. The typical corporation makes commitments to supply' goods amid scm-vices that, if they' are dependahlv honor-ed, require the corporation to have continuing control of its assets. A steel company' cannot relialily stand liv it commitment to fill an order for steel if its shareholders can force it to sell its assets to liurcllase back their stock. The typical com'poration therefore must he organized iti a wit\' that bars investors from reclaiming their fraction of the firmmi's assets, and once the tvpical corporation sells a new issue of shares, the funds it acquires belong to it, not to those who lint-chased the shares.
Continued control hy' the fim-m over its assets is not a prem-equisite to doing business if credible commtlitmemlts of this sort are not necessam-y. Consider the open-ended mutual stock fund. This firm gathers capital from investor-s and uses its skill to place these funds in the shares of other-com-pot-ations. 'l'bese shares can lie sold by the mutual stock fund on a moment's notice should it decide to do sci, atid in doing so it will not he jeopardizing any business commitmnents. Consequently, investors who place their capital at the disposal of open-ended mutual funds can withdraw their pro rata share of the value of the fund's assets should they become displeased with the fund's pet-fot-mnance. Dc facto, the openended mutual fund is obligated to repurchase pro rata investment positions. These investors am-c not shareholders in the conventional sense. They am-c purchasers of investment services, lint they also am-c providers of the capital that is in turn invested in sham-eholdings of other-companies. In the absence of the Glass-Steagall Act, the same arrangement cotrld work for-banks who reinvest depositor funds in the sham-es of other corporations (hut probalily could not work well fom that patt of bank investments that constitutes time-commnitmnent loans to business firms). Should those dlepositors who have made no commitment to keep theft funds with a hank decide to withdr-aw deposits, the bank could sell its shareholdings in other com-porations to cover-the withdrawals.
It is this characteristic, the ability of investordepositor-s to reclaim capital from a fir-mn, that distinguishes these institutions from others for our pum-poses. The closed-end fvuicl does not have this characteristic. It is organized like the typical corporation. It issues shares and converts the funds from their sale to assets that belong to it. Dissatisfied shareholders may' sell their shares, lint they' cannot force the closed-end fund to lie the purchasem-. 'Ibis allows the fund's management to make its investment plans withniut fear of being forced to alter them should investor desires for cash or beliefs about the investment environment change, hut it also eliniinates the threat to mnanagement that it will lose control of fund assets if the fund perfot-ms poorly.
It is this threat in the case of the open-end mutual investment fund that reduces tile "Subsequent sale of shares by shareholders has a depressing effect on the price of the corporation's stock if enough shareholders offer to sell, and this has some disciplining effect on management, but even so, the corporation remains in control of the assets it has acquired. severity' of the sepam'imtion problem. Should investor-s become dissatisfied in large numnliems, mass witbdm-awals would diminish the assets available to a fund's management , forcing it to sell the sham-es they' own in dither-companies. This t-eduction in the wealth available to tile managements of these institutions can take place even if no single investor or small group of in~'estom-shas providedl a liomi's sham-c of the capital being invested. This disciplines the managemnents of these institutions in a way not available to stockholders when they ane disappointed with the managements of typical corporations. The large scale sale of shares in the typical corporation depr'esses sbare price hut does not reclaim assets from management control.
What this means is that managements of institutional investors of the open-ended mutual fummd variety' can lie disciplined directly by' providers of capital even when there is no concentrated 1 iro~'isionof this capital. 'Ihe diffuse owner problem is anielioma ted, liu t only to a limited extent. It is mom-c effectively defused if capital is provided in concentm-ated fashion to the institutional investor, for concentration of rewam-ds and penalties makes the large shameholder nmiore attentive and astute. Now suppose that this type of institutional investor has taken controlling positions in) the equit~'of time firms whose shares it has purchased. The ability' of even diffuse contriliutors of its capital to withdraw their assets surely' makes the institutional investor-represent its investors' interests better than if the thm-eat of withdrawal did not existas lortg as the aliility' of the imistitution to make long-term commit merits is mint irnpomtant to its productivity'. Because of this effect, capital secum-ed from even diffuse sources can lie comhmned without suffering fully' from a separation between ownership amid control. 11
One final point may be raised about another smitH-ce of diffuse owner-ship in the Umlitedl States. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires that firms it lists raise their equity capital or) a one-share, one-vote basis. 'the NYSE did not alw'avs use this standard. It was adopted during the I 920s tinder considerable pressume from government and intellectuals who feared that the gm-owing use of differing vote entitlemnents \•x'as disenfranchising many' equity' capital pmoviders. Nonvoting equity' shares are used much mom-c extensively in other countries. This makes fon a lower cost of establishing controlling equity' positions in a company because only' voting shares must lie reckoned with when considering the direct control of management. Discussion of this issue, however, cannot lie under-taken lieme.
